Market Anomaly: Propping / Capping
Short explanation: Propping supports the spot price using repeated bid walls close to the touch; capping limits upward moves with ask walls. Typical signatures are partial fills followed by immediate replenishment, high order-to-trade ratios (OTR) and a shortened best-quote half-life - without sufficient opposing economic demand/supply. For professionals: sub-second replenishment latency, VWAP drift vs. mid, round-size clusters, and stable cross-venue lead/lag patterns.
Documented scenarios (CEX-based)
- 2013–2014 – Mt. Gox (the “Willy/Markus” bots): Public Gox data shows day-to-day price support via recurring buy sequences with limited counter-volatility - consistent with propping. Status: academically analysed.
- 29 Aug 2024 – order-book depth / spot analyses: Large concentrated sell blocks capped short-lived breakouts (capping); after blocks were removed spread and depth normalized and VWAP converged back to mid. Status: completed analysis.
- 2017 (published 2018/2020) – stablecoin inflows & BTC spot: Time-targeted spot buys after pullbacks show statistical support effects (propping mechanism). Debate on causality continues.
Note: Public enforcement specifically for propping/capping in crypto spot markets is rare; microstructure signatures are nonetheless modellable (replenishment, OTR, half-life, VWAP drift).
How it works
- Set the wall: Large visible limits placed close to the touch (bid = propping, ask = capping) stabilise or constrain price movement.
- Partial fill → refill: After a small fill the order is immediately replenished (same or adjacent tick).
- Queue dominance: Persistent re-quoting dominates the queue; aggressor flows bounce off the wall.
- Differentiation: Not every wall is abusive (TWAP/POV, inventory management, block execution). Key factors are intent, persistence and cross-venue consistency.
Clear detection features (observable live)
- Replenishment signature: repeated refills of the same level within ≤ 300–600 ms after a partial fill; sequences persist for minutes.
- Best-quote half-life ↓: Best bid/ask reverts unusually quickly (P1–P5 vs a 30-day baseline).
- OTR spikes at top-5 depth: many updates per fill; quote-fade just before touch engagement.
- VWAP drift vs mid: propping: VWAP < mid; capping: VWAP > mid - despite small spread changes.
- Round-size / Benford: unusually round sizes (10k / 25k / 50k) and elevated Benford distance (L1) in the sequence.
Why CEXs are vulnerable
- Order toolkit & fees: maker/taker models and VIP rebates make aggressive re-quoting cheaper - the “wall game” can be economically attractive.
- Limited visible depth: L2 feeds & hidden/iceberg orders make verification of remaining size difficult.
- Heterogeneous surveillance & 24/7 trading: no market-wide audit trail; global retail activity amplifies round-number / threshold effects.
- Venue specifics: differing tick/lot rules and queue policies allow queue-gaming at key ticks.
Comparison: regulated exchanges
Rules & obligations: misleading quoting/reporting is sanctioned (e.g. FINRA Rule 5210). Audit trail: the US CAT (SEC Rule 613) captures order life-cycles - sequences (quote→trade→cancel) are analysable and evidential. EU-MAR: forbids false or misleading signals - detection and enforcement risk is higher.
Why early detection is critical - and what’s changing in the EU
- MiCA timeline: in force since 29 June 2023; parts effective from 30 June 2024 (ART/EMT) and CASP obligations from 30 Dec 2024. Transitional arrangements until 01 July 2026 may apply per member state.
- Market integrity (IOSCO): “Same activity, same risk, same outcome” - focus on spot market integrity, monitoring and enforcement.
- Practical benefit: early warning reduces slippage, supports best-execution evidence and builds audit-ready dossiers (E-level flags, UTC timestamps, venues, metrics).
Concrete thresholds / alert rules (E3/E2/E1)
Calibration: per symbol × venue; baseline = 30 days at the same time of day (UTC); hourly bins; tolerance ±15 minutes. Thresholds expressed as percentiles vs baseline.
Sample metrics: OTR, aggressor quote, round-size ratio, Benford distance (L1), spread jump (bps), VWAP drift vs mid (bps), best-quote half-life (ms), replenishment latency (ms), lead/lag (1-s bins, ≥ 3 venues).
E3 (high) - “persistent wall + refill engine”
- Replenishment latency ≤ P1 and best-quote half-life ≤ P1 across ≥ 4 cycles within ≤ 3 min,
- OTR ≥ P99.5 at top-5 depth and round-size ratio ≥ 2× baseline,
- VWAP drift ≥ P99 while spread jump ≤ P50 (damped spread despite pressure),
- Cross-venue consensus: ≥ 3 core venues trigger E2–E3 within ≤ 3 s.
E2 (medium)
- Replenishment latency ≤ P5 on ≥ 2 consecutive levels, or
- best-quote half-life ≤ P5 or OTR ≥ P99,
- Benford distance (L1) ≥ P95 or round-size ratio ≥ 1.5× baseline.
E1 (low)
- Single wall sequence (≥ 2 replenishments in ≤ 2 min) or OTR ≥ P97,
- VWAP drift ≥ P90 (propping negative / capping positive) lasting ≥ 60 s.
De-escalation: downgrade alerts if replenishments stop for ≥ 5 minutes and half-life returns to ≥ P20.
Practical tips (minimising false positives)
- Legitimate alternatives: TWAP/POV resting, inventory management or block executions can look similar; true blocks typically do not produce persistent refill patterns.
- Event filters (UTC): exclude listings/re-listings, maintenance windows, large on-chain transfers, MM withdrawals; exclude macro slots (e.g. CPI / FOMC).
- Cross-venue check: consider E3 only when patterns are consistent across ≥ 3 large venues (single-venue artefacts often false positives).
- Data quality: discard windows with L2 gaps/errors ≥ 1%; compute in bps / ms and store UTC timestamps and notionals.
Why this matters (trader value & compliance)
- Execution: recognise persistent walls - don’t run into them; reduce slippage and optimise limit placement.
- Alpha & risk: exploit reversion after wall removal; avoid unnecessary market impact.
- Governance & supervision: E-level logs with sequence evidence (replenishment, half-life, VWAP drift, OTR) are audit-grade - support best-execution and surveillance under MiCA/MAR.
Relevant sources
- Gandal, Hamrick, Moore, Oberman – Price Manipulation in the Bitcoin Ecosystem (2018).
- Griffin & Shams – Is Bitcoin Really Un-Tethered? (Journal of Finance, Aug 2020; working paper 2018).
- Kaiko – Moving markets: liquidity and large sell orders (29 Aug 2024).
- FINRA – Rule 5210 Publication of Transactions and Quotations (ongoing).
- SEC – Rule 613 Consolidated Audit Trail (CAT) (ongoing).
- ESMA – Statement on MiCA Transitional Measures (17 Dec 2024).
- IOSCO – Policy Recommendations for Crypto- and Digital-Asset Markets (16 Nov 2023).