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Article 18

Market Anomaly: Painting the Tape / Pre-Arranged / Matched Orders

Short explanation: Sequences of pre-arranged, coordinated trades-often between linked or otherwise affiliated accounts-designed to fabricate activity, liquidity or momentum. Related patterns include pre-arranged trades (agreed reciprocal orders) and matched orders (one party’s buy precisely matched by another’s sell). The net effect is artificially inflated volume and apparent momentum that lack genuine economic demand; supervisors treat such signals as false or misleading.

Market CEX Spot, CEX Derivatives
Evidence status & as of Spot-evidenced · As of: October 18, 2025, 12:00 UTC

Documented scenarios (CEX-based)

  • US Operation “Token Mirrors” (DoJ/SEC, 2024–2025): Coordinated market-making-as-a-service networks: bot-driven pseudo-executions and synthetic activity for tokens across multiple CEXs; indictments, pleas and sentences (e.g. CLS Global; defendants including Gotbit/MyTrade). Result: tape beautification by matched counter-trades.
  • Coinbit (KOR, 2020): Reports indicate approximately 99% of reported volume was fake via wash/matched patterns on the Coinbit spot exchange; raids and prosecutions followed. Coordinated reciprocal trades produced a classic “tape-painting” profile: heavy activity without real demand.
  • Bitwise analysis (2019): SEC filings documented patterns of artificial activity-smooth hourly volume profiles, anomalous trade sizes and round-trip sequences-across multiple venues, consistent with coordinated printing of volume.

Context: These cases show pre-arranged counter-trades and activity-driven staging on spot CEXs-functionally painting the tape or creating matched-order patterns.

How it works

  1. Coordination: Affiliated accounts agree on buys/sells within the same price band/time window, often using repeated lot sizes.
  2. Execution: API bots match orders (Account A buys, Account B sells), sometimes mirrored across multiple CEXs. The result is real tape volume but no genuine demand.
  3. Objectives: Ranking / Listing / Marketing (volume increases visibility) and trend anchoring (serial prints create an appearance of momentum).
  4. Distinction: Wash trading implies no change of beneficial ownership (self-trades); matched or pre-arranged trades involve ownership change but are coordinated and economically hollow. All can generate tape effects.

Clear detection features (observable live)

  • Matched counter-prints: Series of near-identical sizes (±2–5%) on bid↔ask at the same price within seconds; round-trip sequences are over-represented.
  • “Lots of tape, little price movement”: High print frequency with minimal mid-price drift and little order-book erosion → activity-without-impact signature.
  • Size anomalies: Rounding clusters or Benford deviations; the same top-N sizes recur unusually often.
  • Cross-venue synchronization (optional): Synchronous series across several CEXs (lead/lag ~0–1 s) without any news catalyst.

Why CEXs are vulnerable

  • Volume-based rankings/listings - fake activity pays off in visibility.
  • High API rates and sub-account structures - coordinated slicing and mirroring are trivial to automate.
  • Limited transparency: public tape lacks counterparty IDs; no CAT-equivalent → proving intent is harder and forensic pattern analysis is required.

Comparison: regulated exchanges

Clear legal framework: Transactions or orders that create false or misleading signals are prohibited; improper matched orders and tape-painting are classic examples. FINRA Rule 5210 requires published transactions be bona fide; self-trades are specifically addressed. Cross-market surveillance (CAT) enables earlier detection-capabilities that are inconsistent across crypto venues.

Why early detection is critical – and what's changing in the EU

  • Price discovery & slippage: Tape effects mislead liquidity assessments and attract follow-on flow, raising execution costs.
  • Reputation / listing risk: Tolerating artificial activity invites regulatory scrutiny and reputational damage.
  • MAR / MiCA: MAR prohibits dissemination of false or misleading signals; MiCA (largely applicable from 30.12.2024, with transitional arrangements until 01.07.2026 in some member states) tightens integrity expectations for CASPs.

Concrete thresholds / alert rules (E3/E2/E1)

Adaptive per symbol/venue; baseline = 30-day history at the same time of day. Required: trade tape (time/price/size); ideal: multi-venue L2/L3 context.

E3 (high) – “Tight mirrored series”

  • ≥ 8 paired prints (bid↔ask at the same price) within ≤ 3 min,
  • Size consistency: median deviation of series sizes ≤ 5%,
  • VWAP drift inside the cluster < 5 bp, spread stable,
  • Benford/rounding anomaly in series sizes > p99 of baseline,
  • (optional) Cross-venue lead/lag ≤ 1 s for ≥ 50% of prints.

Interpretation: activity without impact, tightly matched counter-trades - strong evidence of matched/tape-painting behavior.

E2 (medium)

  • ≥ 5 paired series in ≤ 5 min or top-3 rounding sizes dominate ≥ 70% of prints,
  • Round-trip rate (buy→sell→buy) > p99 with low mid-drift.

E1 (low)

  • “Lots of tape, little price path” (volume ≥ p97, return z-score ≤ 1.0) plus identical size clusters → watchlist until E2/E3 criteria are met.

Practical tips (minimising false positives)

  • Distinguish arbitrage / market-making: genuine MM/arb flows show price convergence, order-book erosion and inventory shifts; tape-painting yields activity without economic effect.
  • Filter news / events: listings, on-chain flows and macro events can generate legitimate bursts-always verify primary sources.
  • Use multi-metrics: size statistics + VWAP drift + round-trips + (optional) cross-venue lead/lag together rather than any single indicator.
  • Learn venue profiles: OTR/cancel rates vary-set baselines per venue and intraday seasonality.
  • Document everything: secure timestamp clusters, histograms, correlations and series lists for audit trails.

Why this matters (trader value & compliance)

  • For traders: avoid FOMO in artificially “busy” markets, reduce slippage and make breakout assessments more realistic.
  • For operators / compliance: series metrics (sizes/timing), round-trips, lack of impact and cross-venue checks yield verifiable evidence-aligned with FINRA / IOSCO / ESMA guidance.

Relevant sources

  • IOSCO – “Investigating and Prosecuting Market Manipulation” (2013) - improper matched orders & tape-painting indicators.
  • ESMA – Market Abuse (MAD/MAR) - examples & guidance on trades/orders that create false or misleading signals.
  • FINRA – Rule 5210 “Publication of Transactions and Quotations”; Regulatory Notices 14-28 / 15-09 (bona-fide distinction; self-trades vs wash/matched).
  • U.S. Department of Justice – “Eighteen Individuals and Entities Charged…” (Operation “Token Mirrors”, 09.10.2024); CLS Global plea/sentencing (2025); Reuters coverage on Gotbit/MyTrade.
  • Bitwise Asset Management – “Analysis of Real Bitcoin Trade Volume” (SEC filings 2019) - evidence of artificial activity/volume anomalies.
  • Coinbit (2020) – CoinDesk/Yahoo Finance/Nasdaq/Decrypt: raid, ~99% fake volume, prosecutions.